

# Democratization and Representative Bureaucracy: An Analysis of Promotion Patterns in Indonesia's Civil Service, 1980–2015

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**Abstract:** *Civil service organizations in the developing world often lack women and minorities in leadership positions. This has important consequences for the quality of public goods provision and the perceived trustworthiness of bureaucrats. We explore the effect of democratization on the discrimination of women and minorities in the civil service. We argue democratization leads to increased discrimination due to the politicization of identity cleavages. We test our argument using administrative data from Indonesia that cover the career histories of more than four million active civil servants. We exploit the exogenous timing of Indonesia's democratization and the staggered introduction of local direct elections for identification purposes. We find strong evidence that democratization worsened the career prospects of female and some religious minority bureaucrats. Penalties are higher for employees of departments led by conservative Muslim parties, in districts with larger Muslim party vote shares or larger Muslim populations, and in the religiously conservative province of Aceh.*

**Verification Materials:** The materials required to verify the computational reproducibility of the results, procedures, and analyses in this article are available on the *American Journal of Political Science* Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/8L1SHV>.

Civil service organizations in the developing world, especially in leadership positions, are often dominated by men and politically influential ethnic or religious groups (Rogger 2017; United Nations 2015). To date, we have an incomplete understanding of the determinants of patterns of descriptive representa-

tion in developing countries' bureaucracies and the ensuing consequences.

Research in political science and economics on the consequences of female and minority representation in *elected* offices has provided evidence for increases in public goods expenditures, changes to the composition

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[Correction added on 16 July 2020 after first online publication: The affiliation for Adam Lauretig has been changed. All of Lauretig's work was completed while employed at JUST Capital.]

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of public goods toward services desired by vulnerable populations, increases in the quality of political candidates, and lowered corruption (or perceived corruption; see, e.g., Barnes and Beaulieu 2014; Besley et al. 2017; Broilo and Troiano 2016; Chin and Prakash 2011; Clayton and Zetterberg 2018; Duflo 2012; Pande 2003; Vernby 2013).

Research on descriptive representation in the civil service is more limited, but existing empirical findings suggest unequal representation in terms of gender or ethnic identity has important consequences for the type and quality of services offered by the state (Bhavnani and Lee 2018; Bradbury and Kellough 2011; Krislov 2012; Park 2013; Pepinsky, Pierskalla, and Sacks 2017; Rasul and Rogger 2015) and citizens' beliefs about bureaucrats' trustworthiness and the bureaucracy's legitimacy (e.g., Barnes, Beaulieu, and Saxton 2018; Mettler 1998; Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena 2014; Theobald and Haider-Markel 2009).

Given the importance of improving developing countries' capacity to provide public goods that reflect diverse interests, we ask: Does democratization improve the career prospects of women and minorities in the bureaucracy?

It is plausible democratization would improve the representation of women and minorities in the civil service. Democracies are thought to be more tolerant, and less likely to infringe on human rights or to engage in outright discrimination against women or minority groups, than autocracies (Davenport and Armstrong 2004). These effects should extend to the treatment of civil servants. Electoral competition has also been associated with an increase in the entry of female politicians and extensions of female suffrage, which may elevate the role of women in the public sector writ large (Folke and Rickne 2016a; Teele forthcoming). Democracies have also increased incentives to provide public goods, since officials' reelection prospects may depend on it. Discrimination against women and minorities constrains bureaucratic performance, as it limits the talent pool from which civil servants are selected and managers are drawn. Diversity in organizations may also lead to productivity gains via the utilization of complementary heuristics and problem-solving approaches (Herring 2009; Hong and Page 2001; Pitts 2009; Rasul and Rogger 2015; Shore et al. 2009).

While it is normatively appealing, we believe this is an overly optimistic view of democracy's effect on representation in a bureaucracy, at least in the context of a developing country without a prior history of democratic competition. Drawing on related work on illiberal tendencies in democracies (Bermeo 2016; Zakaria 1997) and electoral

incentives for ethnic mobilization (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010; Horowitz 1985; Wilkinson 2004), we expect the introduction of electoral accountability in societies with politicized identity cleavages and weak norms of minority protection will empower exclusionary but majoritarian policy positions that worsen the career prospects of women and minorities. Whereas dictators are often insulated from societal preferences for extreme forms of gender- or identity-based discrimination (Htun 2003) or even selectively pursue inclusive policies as a way to ensure their political survival (Donno and Kreft 2019), democratically elected politicians have strong incentives to follow majoritarian pressures in the absence of strong legal protections for minorities or informal norms that safeguard disadvantaged minority groups. Electoral preferences for the exclusion of certain types of individuals or groups from positions of power in public life will spill over from the realm of political candidates to the civil service. Simply put, high-level civil service roles provide control over state resources and are appointed for life. Therefore, appointments to these positions provide credible commitments to exclusionary platforms and confer real and symbolic power.

We study this dynamic in the context of Indonesia's transition to democracy in 1999. For 31 years, President Suharto's regime used the military, the ruling Golkar Party, and, crucially, the state bureaucracy to exercise firm control over Indonesian politics and society. Individuals were selected for leadership positions in the civil service based on whether they could help sustain the authoritarian ruling coalition and Suharto's hold on power. The country's unexpected transition to democracy in 1999 placed electorally accountable political leaders in charge of the vast civil service. Yet, did this regime-level institutional change toward electoral accountability affect the degree of representation in Indonesia's civil service? Specifically, did democratization positively affect the career trajectories and promotion patterns of female and minority civil servants?

Applying our argument to the Indonesian case, we develop observable implications about democratization's effect on the role gender and religious affiliation play in career advancement in Indonesia's civil service. During the Suharto era, the need for regime survival limited mass mobilization based on an exclusionary religious or ethnic identity and extreme forms of discrimination (Hefner 2000). Democratization opened up the political arena to the influences of exclusionary politics. In particular, electoral competition made political elites more receptive to conservative Islamic policy positions, facilitated by the rise of exclusionary Muslim parties and civil society organizations (Buehler 2016; Mietzner, Muhtadi, and Halida

2018). The country also experienced an outbreak of ethnic and religious violence and increased discrimination against religious minorities (Crouch 2011b), in part due to the sudden absence of authoritarian repression of societal conflicts (Tajima 2014). These developments elicited the intensified politicization of gender and religious identity: Exclusionary Islamic actors have pressured politicians to implement policies that restrict religious minorities' role in public life and entrench conservative gender roles in the public and private spheres. Consequently, we expect female and religious minority civil servants have experienced more discrimination under democracy than under autocratic rule.

We test these two predictions in the first microlevel study of promotion patterns under a dictatorship that transitioned to a democracy. Our data draw on the full administrative records of Indonesia's current civil servants, who number over four million. Related prior work by Valsecchi (2016), studying the effects of reelection incentives on corruption, uses aggregate district-level data on the total number of promotions of Indonesian civil servants from 2001 to 2011. We add to this work by tracing individual civil servants' careers from their hire date until 2015 and by assessing the effects of gender and religion on the probability of their promotion before and after democratization. Our research design relies on several levers for causal identification. First, Indonesia's transition to democracy in 1999 was unexpected; the regime is unlikely to have changed its hiring and promotion patterns in anticipation of regime change. Second, we use a difference-in-difference design with individual-level fixed effects to compare career trajectories before and after democratization. Third, we exploit the staggered and exogenous phasing in of direct elections at the local level as an additional source of identification (Martinez-Bravo, Mukherjee, and Stegmann 2017; Pierskalla and Sacks 2018).

We find strong and robust evidence that discrimination against women and some religious minorities has *intensified* as a consequence of democratization and the introduction of direct local elections. We substantiate the role of *elections* in producing these patterns by ruling out alternative explanations, such as differential rates of educational attainment by gender, decentralization reforms, or patronage. Biases against women and minorities are stronger for employees of national ministries headed by members of conservative Muslim parties, in districts with larger Muslim party vote shares or Muslim population shares, and in the religiously conservative province of Aceh. Placebo tests in the Hindu-majority province of Bali reveal no substantive increase in discrimination over the same time period.

Our analysis makes three primary contributions to the literature. First, we add to the literature on women and minorities in politics and bureaucracies. Previous studies have investigated the effects of democratization, the role of quotas, informal glass ceilings, and social biases for the advancement of women and minorities in the *political* realm (e.g., Besley et al. 2017; Caraway 2004; Folke and Rickne 2016b; McDonagh 2002; O'Brien and Rickne 2016). We bring the study of electoral competition to questions of representation in the bureaucracy. We articulate a novel theoretical argument about the pernicious effects of democratic accountability on the advancement of women and minorities in the civil service.

Second, a growing literature has charted the different ways in which electoral competition can trigger discriminatory practices in democratic regimes (e.g., Bermeo 2016; Zakaria 1997). Similarly, an extensive literature on ethnic and religious politics has highlighted the often pernicious instrumentalization of identity cleavages for electoral mobilization (Horowitz 1985; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010; Wilkinson 2004). Our study adds an important component to these literatures. By assessing democratization's impact on women's and religious minorities' representation in the civil service, we shed theoretical and empirical light on exclusionary politics in democracies beyond the narrow realm of candidates and voters, drawing attention to the importance of the state apparatus itself.

Third, previous studies on the effects of democratization and electoral competition on public goods provision have been mostly focused on downstream outcomes, such as government expenditures or infant mortality rates (e.g., Kudamatsu 2012), and have largely neglected the more immediate impacts of institutional change on the management of government service providers. Understanding the internal organization, management, and performance of civil service units in the context of democratic reforms is a crucial first step in the analysis of public goods provision.<sup>1</sup> We contribute to this line of research by studying the management of civil servants under different types of political regimes. Empirically, our study offers the first comprehensive microlevel description of career trajectories in a developing country's bureaucracy before and after a transition from autocracy to democracy using a plausible causal identification strategy.

<sup>1</sup>Gulzar and Pasquale (2017) represent a notable exception. They study the effects of democratic oversight structures on bureaucratic performance.

## Democratization and Representation in the Civil Service

While frontline civil service professions, such as health care workers or teachers, are often fairly balanced in terms of gender and ethnic or religious minority status, the same is generally not true of leadership positions in the civil service (Rogger 2017; United Nations 2015). This pattern even extends to the United States and Western Europe (Krislov 2012).

The lack of women and minorities in civil service leadership positions around the world, particularly in developing countries, is a normative challenge in its own right, and it also has important implications for the operation of civil service organizations. We highlight two such consequences. First, a mounting body of evidence suggests increasing the profile of women and minorities in elected office and public service has meaningful effects on the quality of public goods provision; the types of public goods that are provided, including goods and services that meet the needs of the most vulnerable populations; civil service organizations' ability to understand the needs of their clients; the quality of political leaders; and the degree of corruption in the bureaucracy (Besley et al. 2017; Brollo and Troiano 2016; Chin and Prakash 2011; Clayton and Zetterberg 2018; Duflo 2012; Gulzar, Haas, and Pasquale 2018; Herring 2009; Krislov 2012; Pande 2003; Pepinsky, Pierskalla, and Sacks 2017; Rasul and Rogger 2015; Vernby 2013).

The second implication is that increased representation of women and minority groups in the civil service also has repercussions on the perceived trustworthiness of civil servants. Staffing the civil service with individuals who share ascriptive characteristics—such as ethnicity, gender, language, or culture—with citizens can dramatically affect the perceptions and evaluations of these interactions (Barnes, Beaulieu, and Saxton 2018; Krislov 2012; Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena 2014). It also strengthens civil servants' embeddedness within communities, enabling providers to frame their messages and perform their tasks in culturally appropriate ways, which increases the likelihood recipients will adopt their providers' recommendations (e.g., giving birth in healthcare facilities rather than with traditional birth attendants) and decisions (e.g., eligibility for social protection programs; Tandler and Freedheim 1994). Moreover, citizens who view bureaucratic agents as trustworthy are more likely to view the government as legitimate and are in turn more likely to quasi-voluntarily comply with government rules and regulations like paying taxes, which enhances state capacity in the long run (Levi and Sacks 2009).

Given the importance of better representation in a developing country's civil service organization, how does democratization affect the advancement of women and minorities in its bureaucracy? In the following, we discuss the mechanisms through which democratization might *increase* or *decrease* the representation of women and minorities in management positions in the civil service, starting with a given baseline level of discrimination.

An optimistic view of democratization and democratic accountability would lead us to expect the representation of women and minorities in the civil service would improve after regime change. Democratization implies the empowerment of previously excluded groups through the introduction of competitive, open, and fair elections. Full suffrage should elevate the role of women and ethnic or religious minorities in public life (see, e.g., evidence by Folke and Rickne 2016a on this point). Democratization should not only lead to the rise of more female and minority politicians; politicians should also be more likely to improve gender equity (Brown 2004) and elevate women and minorities to positions of power in the civil service.

More generally, democracies are thought to be inherently more tolerant than other types of regimes and less likely to infringe on human rights and engage in outright discrimination (Davenport and Armstrong 2004). By enshrining individual rights in the constitution and elevating respect for the rule of law, the overt discrimination of women and minorities should abate in general and extend to the treatment of civil servants specifically.

Democratization might also lead to improved representation because diversity in the bureaucracy can enhance the *quality* of the civil service. If democratic accountability provides incentives for politicians to improve the quality of public goods provision, they will be motivated to improve the management of the civil service. For one, the literature above suggests improved public goods provision as a consequence of better representation. In addition, excluding groups such as women or ethnic and religious minorities from promotions *ex ante* shrinks the pool of high-quality individuals, thus reducing the chances of promoting the most-skilled individuals (Murray 2014). This is counterproductive to the goal of improved public goods provision.

We argue this optimistic view of democratization is misplaced, especially in young democracies with politicized identity cleavages, weak informal norms for protecting minority groups, and a lack of programmatic political parties. Existing work on ethnic outbidding and mobilization has already identified the potentially pernicious role of electoral competition for identity politics and identity-related violence (Horowitz 1985; Wilkinson

2004). We build on this literature and specify an argument detailing the consequences of a transition from autocracy to democracy for the role of identity politics in the civil service.

Whereas dictators view ethnic and gender politics through the lens of macrolevel regime stability and their own political survival, politicians in young democracies try to win specific electoral races. Since democratization typically also removes autocratic constraints on freedom of speech and political association, political entrepreneurs can exploit identity cleavages much more than under autocratic rule. If it generates an electoral advantage, political entrepreneurs will capitalize on the majority's wish to discriminate against minority groups and embrace preexisting conservative gender or anti-minority norms (where present).

Elections amplify the politicization of identity cleavages that were more heavily constrained during authoritarian rule. Since individual politicians are focused on their specific constituencies and electoral contests, they do not need to internalize the possibly pernicious macrolevel effects of increased discrimination as a dictator would. Whereas dictators are free to ignore majoritarian demands for discrimination when it is politically expedient, due to their greater political insulation, electorally accountable politicians often do not have that luxury.<sup>2</sup>

Importantly, this majoritarian impetus toward exclusionary politics after democratization is often not counterbalanced by strong norms of minority protection, which may take decades to develop. Although established democratic regimes may feature important formal and informal norms regarding appropriate political conduct that would inherently limit overtly racist or sexist policies, young democracies typically lack this additional layer of protection.

Under these conditions, we expect democratization to produce more exclusionary politics in general and more discriminatory management in the civil service. High-level positions in the civil service are an important material and symbolic resource, convey control over valuable state resources, and, given the high degree of discretion in the civil service, can be leveraged as a conduit for distributive and patronage politics (Aspinall and Berenschot 2019; Pierskalla and Sacks forthcoming). Since non-elected officials exercise broad powers over public policy, exclusionary electoral politics will extend to the control of nonelected officials to safeguard the power of majority groups over this crucial reservoir of material and politi-

cal power. Appointing individuals to lifetime, high-level leadership positions in the civil service who accord with a particular identity profile demanded by politically influential groups is a credible signal to exclusionary politics and has strong symbolic and material value for electoral politics. Hence, majoritarian coalitions that actively elevate specific ethnic or religious identities or espouse conservative gender roles will also articulate these preferences in personnel decisions.

## Implications for Indonesia

What are the observable implications of this argument for the case of Indonesia? The country's civil service has traditionally been dominated by Muslim men from Java.<sup>3</sup> Yet the Suharto regime neither fully excluded women from positions of power nor excluded all non-Muslims or non-Javanese from the civil service.

While the Suharto regime did not empower women, it embraced the idea that women have the ability to act as caretakers of domestic, economic, and even state affairs (Suryakusuma 2011). Even discrimination against ethnically Chinese Indonesians, the most common target of majority discrimination, was limited by an informal bargain between the regime and wealthy Chinese businessmen defining spheres of influence in which the Chinese provided the state with economic resources without gaining political power in return (Chua 2008).

Although women and some ethnic and religious minorities experienced discrimination under autocratic rule, the overarching goal of regime survival deterred the extreme marginalization of any group. President Suharto enforced clear limits on ethnic and religious discrimination and violence. For example, he blocked the ascendancy of radical political parties or hard-line Islamic fundamentalists (Hefner 2000).<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup>It is worth pointing out there is a common distinction between *abangan* (traditionalist and syncretist) and *santri* (modernist) Muslims in Indonesian Islam. Historically, the former, *abangan* Muslims, were the numerically and politically dominant force and were well represented in the civil service. Given the nature of our data and focus on the difference between Muslim and non-Muslim civil servants, we have to ignore this nuanced difference in our analysis.

<sup>4</sup>In the 1990s, the Suharto regime began a reorientation toward political Islam, elevating several influential Islamic leaders to more prominent positions of power, signifying a shift in comparison to the preexisting ruling coalition (Aspinall 2005; Hefner 2000). The regime supported the creation of the Indonesian Association of Islamic Intellectuals (ICMI) in 1990. ICMI openly embraced an agenda of elevating Muslims to a position of increased political dominance and reducing the role of Indonesian Chinese and Catholics in the state apparatus (Aspinall 2005, 57). As such, ICMI is an important precursor to the dynamics we describe here.

<sup>2</sup>For instance, Htun (2003) shows Latin American dictators' isolation from societal pressures allowed them to advance gender equality reforms.

Democratization weakened the state's ability to control political conflict over these preexisting cleavages, which led to an outbreak of religious and ethnic violence in the aftermath of democratization (Tajima 2014). Even though outright violence has dissipated since then, the country's democratic political arena substantially changed after the fall of the Suharto regime; more extreme ideologies have found a political voice, representation, and influence. For example, while the electoral fortunes of conservative Muslim parties have fluctuated since 1999, they currently hold seats in many local or regional legislatures and the national parliament (Hamayotsu 2011). In some districts, electoral competition has also led to the passage of local *shari'a* ordinances by making incumbent political elites more responsive to the mobilizational power of Islamic civil society organizations (Buehler 2016). Open discrimination against small religious minority groups, such as the Ahmadiya sect, as well as restrictions on church construction by mainstream Christian denominations, have increased since 1999 (Crouch 2011a). Lawsuits based on the 1965 blasphemy law have also drastically multiplied since democratization: 89 out of a total of 97 cases have been brought since 1998 (Setara Institute for Democracy and Peace 2017). Increasingly, radical groups like the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) have demonstrated their political influence (Mietzner, Muhtadi, and Halida 2018). Beyond these more radical actors, Indonesia's major Muslim mass organizations, *Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah*, have also revealed a willingness to prioritize Islamic values and Islamic political control over pluralism (Menchik 2019). Overall, democracy has allowed an increasingly conservative form of "Islamic populism" to emerge (Hadiz 2016). The growing influence of radical Muslim thought, including more conservative gender roles (Suryakusuma 2012), has also affected the perceived role of women in society.

Consequently, gender and religion map onto important political cleavages and have become increasingly politicized due to the rise of political Islam. We expect the increased politicization of gender and religion in Indonesia's public sphere has extended to the civil service, generating political constituencies that object to women or religious minorities holding civil service management positions. To be clear, while most Indonesians do not actively support minority and gender discrimination, a growing minority of very conservative Islamic activists is influencing public discourse and decision making. While women and religious minorities are likely to have suffered some degree of discrimination in the civil service under autocratic rule, we expect this discrimination to have become more widespread in the civil service after democratization:

*Main Hypothesis:* Democratization amplifies the negative effect of being female or a member of a religious minority group on promotions.

## Indonesia's Civil Service and the Transition to Democracy

Between 1965 and 1998, Indonesia was governed by a starkly centralized, authoritarian regime under the leadership of General Suharto. His "New Order" regime centralized decision-making power around the presidency and ruled the country with the help of the military, the ruling party Golkar (*Golongan Karya*, "functional groups"), and the civil service. The latter two were intimately intertwined. The Golkar Party started as an association of functional groups, one of which was of civil servants. Golkar became a political vehicle for the regime and a highly effective tool for winning authoritarian elections. All civil servants were required to support Golkar; they constituted a core support pillar for the regime.

Indonesia's sudden transition to democracy, triggered by the East Asian financial crisis, dramatically changed its political institutions. The country experienced a fast progression toward democratic accountability: It held national and local elections in 1999, while simultaneously passing a massive decentralization reform.

Indonesia's civil service has increased from around 3.6 million in 2006 to roughly 4.5 million (about 1.7% of the population) today; civil servants are employed by over 600 national, regional, and local governments, ministries, and agencies.

Muslim men have traditionally dominated the Indonesian civil service—particularly its leadership positions. The smaller role of women in the public sector mirrors the bias against women in the country's private sector (Wright and Crockett Tellei 1993). In 2015, at the two top levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy in national ministries, 72.2% and 78.1% of employees were men, respectively (based on the authors' calculations). The vast majority of female civil servants are employed as teachers and nurses. Although overall female representation in the civil service has improved since the 1970s, this pattern of male dominance has a long tradition and reflects societal norms and biases.

Religious representation in the civil service roughly matches the general population, although at higher ranks within the civil service, religious minorities (i.e., non-Muslims) are less well represented than in the overall civil servant population. Table 1 provides a descriptive

**TABLE 1** Share of Women and Religious Affiliation across Echelon Levels

Echelon	Female	Muslim	Catholic	Protestant	Hindu	Buddhist	Confucian	Other
Echelon 1	0.276	0.888	0.032	0.067	0.013	0.000	0.000	0.000
Echelon 2	0.163	0.792	0.047	0.140	0.021	>0.000	0.000	0.000
Echelon 3	0.215	0.791	0.048	0.141	0.019	0.001	0.000	>0.000
Echelon 4	0.351	0.815	0.043	0.123	0.019	>0.000	>0.000	>0.000
Non-Echelon	0.515	0.825	0.041	0.110	0.024	>0.000	>0.000	>0.000
General Population	0.497	0.870	0.030	0.070	0.017	0.007	0.005	0.001

overview of the representation of women and religious groups in Indonesia's civil service across the different levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy.

## Research Design

To assess the effects of democratization on promotion patterns in Indonesia's civil service, we created an individual-level database of civil servants and their career trajectories. It contains information on all of the country's more than four million currently active civil servants (i.e., it excludes retired employees).<sup>5</sup> Each civil servant has an individual entry detailing basic characteristics like gender, age, religion, educational attainment, place of birth, current workplace, job type, civil service rank, and date of entry into the civil service. We supplement this database with information on each individual's past job assignments—including workplace, work location, job type, and associated rank—to construct a panel data set with the civil-servant-year as the unit of analysis.<sup>6</sup> Observations begin when an individual enters the civil service and end in 2015. For example, a civil servant who started in 1980 would generate a total of 36 civil-servant-year observations. Since the vast majority of civil servants spend their entire 30–40-year career in government service, our data cover a large portion of individuals who have been active since the early 1990s.

The data thus allow us to observe individual career trajectories before and after Indonesia's sudden democratization in 1999. While rumors before this time hinted Suharto was in poor health and was unlikely to remain in office much longer (Fisman 2001), neither the even-

tual timing of his departure nor the regime's transition to democracy was widely expected. The president and his ruling Golkar Party had garnered 74.51% of the popular vote and 76.47% of seats in the legislature in the 1997 elections, which suggests the regime was still strong at that point.

We exploit this sudden, unplanned transition for identification purposes. Since Suharto's ruling coalition did not anticipate his downfall or an imminent transition to democracy, promotion patterns in the civil service before 1999 very likely followed an established pattern supporting the regime's needs. After 1999, the shift toward democratic elections placed elected politicians in control of the civil service, which might have led to a change in promotion practices. Indonesia serves as a hard test of our theoretical expectations since nearly all of the elites in the military, civil service, and ruling party retained their positions. Appendix A in the supporting information (SI) provides a more detailed discussion of the parallel trends assumption in this case as well as relevant diagnostic plots.

Democratization might be expected to have changed recruitment patterns into the civil service. For example, more regime-critical individuals might have opted to enter the civil service after 1999, which could have changed the overall composition of civil servants in terms of either observable or unobservable characteristics.<sup>7</sup> To address this concern, we also analyze a subsample of our data including only individuals hired before 1999. These individuals were subject to the same recruitment process under autocratic rule.<sup>8</sup>

We estimate the effects of democratization in a difference-in-differences setting. We observe the effect

<sup>5</sup>The database also excludes military personnel, police officers, and members of the internal security service.

<sup>6</sup>This expands on prior work by Valsecchi (2016), which measures the total number of promotions at the district level from 2001 to 2011 to study the effects of reelection incentives on corruption by comparing term-limited district heads to district heads running for reelection.

<sup>7</sup>SI Appendix O provides evidence that does not seem to be the case, based on a comparison of observable characteristics of incoming cohorts.

<sup>8</sup>One concern might be pre-1999 hires experiencing discrimination after democratization due to their affiliation with the autocratic regime. Since there were hardly any repercussions for regime involvement beyond Suharto and his immediate family, we find this unlikely.

of civil servants' individual characteristics on their career trajectories before and after 1999, allowing for the effects to differ:

$$y_{idpgt} = \alpha_i + \gamma_d + \eta_p + \rho_g + \tau_t + \beta \cdot \mathbf{x}_{it} + \delta \cdot \text{post-1999}_t \cdot \mathbf{x}_{it} + \theta \cdot \mathbf{z}_{it} + \epsilon_{idpgt},$$

where  $y_{idpgt}$  is a binary dependent variable indicating a promotion event in year  $t$ ,  $\alpha_i$  is an individual-level fixed effect,  $\gamma_d$  is a civil service department fixed effect,  $\eta_p$  a province-of-birth fixed effect,  $\rho_g$  a rank fixed effect (explained below), and  $\tau_t$  a year fixed effect. Our analyses always include year effects to model secular changes in promotion patterns, but varying combinations of group fixed effects. In the most lenient specification, we combine department and province-of-birth effects, which allows us to estimate the baseline effects of individual characteristics like gender and religion  $\mathbf{x}_{it}$  and additional individual-level controls  $\mathbf{z}_{it}$ . In the most conservative specification, we include the more general individual-level fixed effects, which absorb the individual-level covariates and province-of-birth fixed effects. To capture the effects of democratization, we include an interaction term of a post-1999 dummy variable with our set of individual-level predictors of interest ( $\mathbf{x}_{it}$ ). The constituent term for the post-democratization dummy is always absorbed in the year fixed effects. The coefficient  $\delta$  is our main effect of interest because it captures the extent to which democratization has changed the effects of gender and religious affiliation.

Overall, causal identification is plausible in this case because the exogenous nature of the democratization reform, paired with our battery of fixed effects, ought to render the influence of unobservable characteristics negligible. We estimate these models using a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) method and cluster standard errors at the individual level.<sup>9</sup>

## Measurement and Variable Definitions

To measure career progression in Indonesia's civil service, we rely on the official *echelon* classification system, which indicates the level of hierarchy a management-level civil servant has attained.<sup>10</sup> The vast majority of civil servants (e.g., teachers and healthcare workers) lack an echelon level (and are thus coded 0) since they have no management responsibilities. All civil servants initially enter

<sup>9</sup>All estimations were implemented using the statistical software R version 3.4.2 on the Ohio Supercomputer Center's *Unity* cluster (Ohio Supercomputer Center 1987).

<sup>10</sup>SI Appendix R discusses an alternative system of career advancement.

without an echelon rank.<sup>11</sup> For those with management responsibilities, official grades range from the lowest level of V to the top levels of Ia and Ib.<sup>12</sup> Civil servants in echelons Ia and Ib include heads of national agencies, inspector generals, and deputy cabinet secretaries.

We use this classification system to create a dummy variable that records promotion events: It takes a value of 1 for each civil-servant-year with an upward move on the echelon scale, and 0 otherwise. Decisions to move up the echelon scale must be approved by a panel of the candidate's superiors.<sup>13</sup> The panel takes into consideration the candidate's performance (e.g., via annual performance reviews) but often decisions are affected by politicians via official and unofficial channels of influence. For example, at the local level, elected district mayors have extensive control over promotion decisions. Therefore, we believe this is a uniquely powerful indicator of career advancement that captures the extent to which political priorities regarding representation are translated into policy.

We are primarily interested in how democratization affected gender- and religion-based representation in the civil service. Gender is a simple dummy variable, taking a value of 1 for women, while religious affiliation is captured in seven distinct categories in the database: Muslim (reference category), Protestant, Catholic, Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian, and Other.<sup>14</sup>

Our models without individual-level fixed effects include three additional covariates that are important predictors of career advancement and might correlate with gender or religion—a civil servant's age, number of years in the civil service, and level of educational attainment. The first two are simple count variables. To measure educational attainment, we create a variable with six distinct categorical outcomes: elementary school (reference

<sup>11</sup>There is no open competition for high-level civil service positions. The government only recently considered introducing open competition for echelons I and II.

<sup>12</sup>Though we include echelon V in the analysis, Indonesian law no longer recognizes this level in Indonesia's Law No. 5 Year 2014 on Civil Service Apparatus.

<sup>13</sup>Since we do not observe which civil servants decline to be considered for promotion, some of our results could be driven by bottom-up decisions rather than top-down discrimination. This would still be in line with our outlined mechanism and likely contribute to an underestimate of the effect.

<sup>14</sup>While officially recognized in the constitution, Confucianism was not recorded on official documents until 2006. Confucians previously had to register as Christian or Buddhist. It is unclear whether the information on religious identification used to create the database is based solely on identity cards or self-reported by civil servants. Regardless, we are likely underestimating the full extent of discrimination against Confucian civil servants.

category), junior high school, senior high school, diploma I/II/III (equivalent to 1–3 years of college), diploma IV/bachelor (4 years of college), and postgraduate degree.

The fixed effects cover the individual's province of birth to account for the influence of cultural and ethnic networks in the civil service, as well as department unit fixed effects. The latter control for unobserved confounders at the unit level to account for some departments, such as the central bank, which might have specific demands for educational attainment or be governed by department-specific norms. Last, some of our model specifications also include fixed effects to indicate an individual's *golongan* or rank (see SI Appendix R).

## Promotion Results

We begin by assessing the effects of gender on promotions. Table 2 displays coefficient estimates for a variety of models.<sup>15</sup> Model 1 is our lenient specification with individual-level covariates, province of birth, department, and year fixed effects. Model 2 replaces province of birth with individual-level fixed effects, and Model 3 adds *golongan* fixed effects. Models 4–6 have the same specification, but we only use the subsample of civil servants hired before 1999.

Model 1 indicates female civil servants before 1999 were, on average, 0.2 percentage points less likely to be promoted than comparable men. This penalty is equivalent to 13% of their baseline probability of promotion and increased by a full percentage point post-1999 for women: The interaction term between gender and the post-1999 dummy is estimated at  $-0.01$ , which is statistically significant below the 1% level. We find nearly identical estimates for this increase in the penalty across Models 2–6. Regardless of the specification or sample, the data clearly indicate democratization has substantially worsened the career prospects of female civil servants, which supports our main hypothesis.

Our second test of the main hypothesis examines the promotion of religious minorities. We explore the role of bias against minority religions by interacting our dummy variables for religious affiliation with the post-1999 dummy. Table 3 presents our main findings. Model 1 indicates affiliates of minority religions generally suffered a career penalty prior to 1999. Protestants, Catholics, and

Confucians all experienced statistically significant penalties compared to Muslim civil servants.

For this specification, we find, on average, most minority religions experienced an increase in discrimination after democratization, although we cannot consistently distinguish these changes statistically from zero. The results are much clearer for the models with individual-level fixed effects, which illustrate a consistent pattern of increased discrimination against Protestant, Confucian, and Hindu civil servants. Each of these minority groups experienced a consistent penalty post-1999 that substantially diminished its position. It is unsurprising the effects are largest for Confucians because they are nearly universally ethnically Chinese and subject to widespread exclusion.<sup>16</sup>

## Mechanisms

Our main findings indicate democratization has worsened the promotion penalties for female civil servants and some religious minorities. These findings are robust to other model specifications and estimation strategies, the inclusion of department- or province-specific time trends, and alternative clustering of standard errors (see SI Appendix B). In this section, we discuss a series of auxiliary tests that further unpack the underlying mechanism.

## Variation by Year

To test whether the effects of gender and religion truly changed as a consequence of the country's democratization in 1999, we use a flexible specification that interacts our variables of interest with the year dummies (see Angrist and Pischke 2009; Mora and Reggio 2019). This method has several advantages. First, it allows us to flexibly trace changes in the effects of gender and religion over the full time period. Second, due to the interaction of year dummies with the group identifiers, the model accounts for group-specific trends, which require weaker identification assumptions than the standard parallel trends in a generic difference-in-difference specification.

Figures 1 and 2 show the varying differential effects by year above the baseline effects. The patterns strongly

<sup>15</sup>The tables display coefficient estimates for the constituent term of the “treated” group and the key difference-in-difference interaction term.

<sup>16</sup>Since ethnic Chinese Indonesians, the most excluded minority category, often identify as Catholic or Protestant, we are likely underestimating the degree of discrimination experienced by this group. Note that civil servants identifying as Confucian is a very small group and results should be interpreted with caution.

TABLE 2 Promotion Analysis: Gender

	Promotion (1)	Promotion (2)	Promotion (3)	Promotion (4)	Promotion (5)	Promotion (6)
Female	−0.002**			−0.002**		
	0.000			0.000		
Female*Post-Democratization	−0.012**	−0.009**	−0.009**	−0.011**	−0.009**	−0.009**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Pre-1999	Pre-1999	Pre-1999
Department Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province of Birth Fixed Effects	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Individual Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Golongan Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	51,674,834	51,674,834	51,674,834	30,130,880	30,130,880	30,130,880
R <sup>2</sup>	0.026	0.201	0.201	0.029	0.182	0.182
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.026	0.143	0.143	0.029	0.155	0.155
Residual Std. Error	0.121	0.114	0.114	0.105	0.098	0.098

Note: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

\*\*Significant at the 1% level, \*Significant at the 5% level, †Significant at the 10% level.

support our initial findings. Figure 1 shows the penalty for female civil servants increased substantially in 2001. This is plausible since it likely took 1–2 years before any change in the top political leadership had real effects on promotion patterns in the civil service. Figure 2 distinguishes the major religious groups' penalties over time relative to the Muslim majority. The plot indicates discrimination increased post-1999 for Protestants, Catholics, Buddhists, and Confucian civil servants.

### Decentralization and Local Elections

Figure 1 shows a structural break for the gender penalty around 2001, which might indicate that the 2001 decentralization reforms, rather than the introduction of democratic accountability, caused the observed shifts in the promotion patterns. SI Appendix C discusses evidence against the effects of decentralization independent of electoral accountability, by focusing on the subset of central government employees only.

To further demonstrate that changes to *political accountability*—rather than *decentralization*—are driving our findings, we exploit the introduction of direct local elections in 2005. District governments are headed by local mayors who were previously elected indirectly via local legislatures. This process was fraught with political corruption and backroom deals, and produced local

leaders who were not particularly accountable to the local population. The 2005 electoral reform created a much more competitive local electoral process, and we exploit its staggered introduction over a 5 year period for identification purposes. The timing of the introduction of direct elections varied according to when the terms of sitting incumbents ended, which in turn depended on their dates of appointment under the Suharto regime. Thus from 2005 onward, district governments successively switched to direct and more competitive local elections, allowing us to generate an exogenously determined indicator of treatment. This natural experiment has already been exploited by a number of previous studies (e.g., Martinez-Bravo, Mukherjee, and Stegmann 2017; Pierskalla and Sacks 2018). We subset our original panel of civil servants, selecting only district-level employees in the post-2000 period, to test whether the introduction of local elections had a similar impact on the effects of gender and religion. Since district heads are the final arbiters of promotions within district governments, and the timing of the introduction of local direct elections varies, we have a powerful design to check the robustness of our initial results.

We estimate the following type of model:

$$\begin{aligned}
 y_{idpgt} = & \alpha_i + \gamma_d + \eta_p + \rho_g + \tau_t + \kappa \cdot \mathbf{m}_{dt} \\
 & + \beta \cdot \mathbf{x}_{it} + \eta \cdot \text{Local Elections}_{dt} \\
 & + \delta \cdot \text{Local Elections}_{dt} \cdot \mathbf{x}_{it} + \theta \cdot \mathbf{z}_{it} + \epsilon_{idpgt}
 \end{aligned}$$

TABLE 3 Promotion Analysis: Religion

	Promotion (1)	Promotion (2)	Promotion (3)	Promotion (4)	Promotion (5)	Promotion (6)
Protestant	−0.004**			−0.002**		
	0.000			0.000		
Catholic	−0.003**			−0.003**		
	0.000			0.000		
Buddhist	0.002			0.002		
	(0.003)			(0.003)		
Hindu	−0.002**			−0.001		
	(0.001)			(0.001)		
Confucian	−0.021 <sup>†</sup>			−0.020*		
	0.011			0.009		
Protestant × Post-Democratization	0.001**	−0.000*	−0.000*	−0.000 <sup>†</sup>	−0.000*	−0.000*
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Catholic × Post-Democratization	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	0.000	−0.000	−0.000
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Buddhist × Post-Democratization	−0.003	−0.002	−0.002	−0.003	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Hindu × Post-Democratization	−0.001 <sup>†</sup>	−0.002**	−0.002**	−0.000	−0.002**	−0.002**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Confucian × Post-Democratization	−0.006	−0.008**	−0.008**	−0.004*	−0.008**	−0.008**
	0.006	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.000
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Pre-1999	Pre-1999	Pre-1999
Department Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province of Birth Fixed Effects	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Individual Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Golongan Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	51,674,834	51,674,834	51,674,834	30,130,880	30,130,880	30,130,880
R <sup>2</sup>	0.025	0.201	0.201	0.029	0.182	0.182
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.025	0.143	0.143	0.029	0.154	0.154
Residual Std. Error	0.121	0.114	0.114	0.105	0.098	0.098

Note: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

\*\*Significant at the 1% level, \*significant at the 5% level, <sup>†</sup>significant at the 10% level.


This model has a structure similar to our initial specification, but it includes district government fixed effects  $\gamma_d$  instead of the more general department fixed effects, the same set of individual-level controls  $\mathbf{x}_{it}$  and  $\mathbf{z}_{it}$ , and additional, time-varying district-level control variables  $\mathbf{m}_{dt}$ . We include a dummy variable for incumbent district heads running for reelection, the effective number of parties in the local legislature, the vote share of the Golkar and PDI-P parties in the local legislature, an index of the quality of local services provision,<sup>17</sup> natural resource rev-

<sup>17</sup>This index is based on access to safe water, safe sanitation, enrollment levels, the presence of asphalt roads, and the percentage of births attended by skilled staff.

enue per capita, total revenue per capita, a Gini index of consumption inequality, logged total population of the district, the number of people below the poverty line per capita, and logged GDP per capita. The main difference compared to our prior specification is the inclusion of a time-varying binary indicator of the introduction of local elections, *Local Elections*, which we also interact with the gender dummy and religious affiliation. We estimate the same set of models as in Tables 2 and 3, varying the set of fixed effects and excluding post-1999 hires. SI Appendix D reports our findings.

In line with our initial findings, the introduction of direct elections has shifted the promotion penalty

**FIGURE 1 Differential Effect of the Gender Penalty over Baseline by Year**



Note: The plot shows the estimated interaction effect between the female variable and the year effects and their associated 95% confidence intervals.

for women. Before the introduction of direct elections, women experienced a 1 percentage point penalty in their chance of being promoted within district governments. After the introduction of direct elections, this effect worsens by 0.4–1 percentage points, depending on the model (the interaction effect is consistently statistically significant at the 1% level).

Religious minorities—particularly Confucian, Hindu, and Other—also experienced a promotion penalty after the introduction of direct elections. These findings enhance the credibility of our main results and provide further evidence that changes in *electoral accountability*, not decentralization or other (possibly unobserved) contemporaneous shocks, caused the changes to the gender and religion penalty. Note that we cannot directly determine whether electoral accountability led to the emergence of a new type of politician or changed the behavior of the existing set of political leaders. This is a nuanced but important distinction in terms of the exact theoretical mechanism. We tend to believe it is the latter since descriptive evidence suggests the vast majority of authoritarian political elites decided to run for office post-democratization, indicating there was a high degree of persistence in political elites (Martinez-Bravo, Mukherjee, and Stegmann 2017).

### Alternative Explanations of Gender Bias


In SI Appendix E, we consider a series of possible alternative explanation for the gender bias finding, ranging from differential rates of education attainment for women, changing labor market opportunities in the private sector, and female leadership of the civil service, none of which emerge as plausible explanations for our results. We also explore the variation of effect sizes along the echelon hierarchy. We find our results are similar across the hierarchy for religious minorities but strongest for initial promotions for women.<sup>18</sup>

### Patronage

Another possible explanation for the reduced career prospects for female and religious minority civil servants could be the specific role of patronage politics and clientelism in Indonesia's democracy. After the fall of the Suharto regime, democratization has decentralized the prior "franchise system" of corruption, which has led to an overall intensification of patronage politics, clientelism, and corruption (Aspinall and Berenschot

<sup>18</sup>Results available on request.

**FIGURE 2 Differential Effect of the Religion Penalty over Baseline by Year**



*Note:* The plot shows the estimated interaction effect between the religion variables and the year effects and their associated 95% confidence intervals.

2019; McLeod 2000). SI Appendix Q discusses in more detail the role of patronage politics in Indonesia’s civil service after democratization. Although patronage is likely part of the story, we believe it cannot fully explain our findings.

### Political Islam

To test whether the mechanism underlying increased discrimination in the aftermath of democratization is tied to majoritarian preferences and the growing political influence of political actors who leverage identity frames for political gains, we implement a series of additional tests.

First, if democratization has led to the rise of political actors who champion more conservative gender and religious norms, we would also expect to observe associated changes in attitudes at the mass level. To investigate this possibility, we examined a series of questions included in both the 1999 and 2006 waves of the World Values Survey

that capture attitudes about gender and religious norms. We compare responses to questions about whether politicians should believe in God, whether attending university is more important for boys than girls, whether men make better leaders, and if being a housewife is as valuable as working. Between 1999 and 2006, attitudes became more conservative with respect to the role of religion and traditional gender roles (see SI Appendix H). A more recent survey finds similarly broad societal support for conservative Islamic practices and norms (Fossati, Yew-Foong, and Negara 2017). This finding is consistent with our argument about increased discrimination as a consequence of the politicization of cleavages after democratization.

Second, we also estimate our gender and religion model, adding a triple interaction with a dummy variable for civil servants living in the country’s most religiously conservative province, Aceh. If our argument is correct, we expect discrimination patterns to be even more pronounced for civil servants in Aceh after 1999.

Conservative Islamic social norms are widespread in Aceh, and religious issues played a role in the separatist conflict with the central government. SI Appendix I reports our findings. Again, we find patterns consistent with our mechanism. Female civil servants experience an additional one-percentage-point penalty in Aceh compared to elsewhere in the country post-1999. Our results for religious affiliation show Protestants receive fewer promotions post-1999 in Aceh compared to other regions. There is no difference for other religions. This is likely due to the lack of non-Muslim or non-Christian civil servants in Aceh, making Christians the most important local religious minority. In contrast, when we estimate the same set of models for the Hindu-majority province of Bali as a placebo test, we find no evidence of increased discrimination of religious minorities and much weaker discrimination effects for women (see SI Appendix J).

Third, we exploit the party affiliation of Indonesian ministers after 1999 to test the discrimination mechanism for gender and religion. Since democratization, Indonesian governments have featured a broad range of parties in oversized cabinets, which has elevated members of conservative Muslim parties to positions of influence. If our suggested mechanism is correct, we would expect female and religious minority employees of ministries led by the most conservative ministers to experience larger promotion penalties than employees of other government units. To test this theory, we coded the party affiliations of all ministers from 1999 to 2015. We classify a minister as religiously conservative if he or she belongs to one of the parties considered to be “Islamist” instead of “Islam inclusive” or “secular inclusive” (following Baswedan 2004).<sup>19</sup> We focus on our sample of national-level employees from 1999 onward. We interact a dummy variable indicating a ministry led by a conservative Islamic party with our gender and religious affiliation dummies. SI Appendix K reports our results. As expected, we find in democratic Indonesia the promotion penalty for female civil servants is greater in ministries led by members of conservative Islamic parties. We find a similar, albeit weaker, pattern for religious affiliation. Civil servants with a religion identified as “other” experience a stronger promotion penalty under Islamic party leadership. The statistical significance might be lower for this finding simply because there are few minority (e.g., Confucian) civil servants in national ministries.

Fourth, we extend this approach to the district level. Using data from the 1999, 2004, and 2009 local legislative

elections, we calculate the total vote share of conservative Muslim parties at the local level.<sup>20</sup> We then rerun our district-level regressions for the years 2001–15 and interact the introduction of direct elections with the vote share of Muslim parties. We expect districts with more conservative societal preferences (as expressed via voting for conservative Muslim parties) experienced stronger discrimination against women and religious minorities once direct elections allowed for the unconstrained expression of these preferences. SI Appendix L shows results consistent with our expectations. Direct elections increased the gender penalty, especially in districts with higher Muslim party vote shares (the triple interaction term is negative and statistically significant below the 1% level in most models). We find a similar pattern for Confucian civil servants.

Fifth, we use data from the 2000 population census to calculate the population share of Muslims and Christians across districts. We then estimate triple interactions for our local election model. We find the increase in discrimination is concentrated in districts with larger shares of the Muslim population, while no such pattern emerges in districts with a large Christian population (SI Appendices M and N).

## Conclusion

Does democratization affect promotion practices in the civil service with respect to gender and minority status? Improving the representation of women and minorities in the civil service likely has important consequences for the quality of public services provision and the trustworthiness and perceived legitimacy of the state. In fact, with respect to the quality of services provision, this seems to be the case in Indonesia. In SI Appendix P, we provide descriptive evidence that districts with a higher share of female civil servants feature lower poverty rates, more births attended by skilled staff, and better road quality. Consequently, investigating the extent to which the introduction of electoral accountability for political leaders at the top of the civil service changes the fates of female and religious minority civil servants promises important insights for our understanding not only of state performance but also democracy writ large.

<sup>19</sup>This categorization classifies members of the Prosperous Justice Party, the Crescent Star Party, or the United Development Party as more conservative.

<sup>20</sup>Note that this is a strong test. As Buehler (2016) points out, the dominance of Islamist parties is not necessarily the strongest indicator of the Islamization of local politics because it neglects the influence of Islamist movements outside of political parties.

We argue that in a young democracy with identity cleavages but weak norms of minority protection, electoral competition will politicize these cleavages. Political entrepreneurs will use identity-related issues to win votes, which spills over to the management of the civil service. If the society's majority supports discrimination against particular groups, democratization can lead to worsened representation in the bureaucracy than under dictatorship.

We test this hypothesis using a unique natural experiment in Indonesia, where democratization opened the political arena and allowed more conservative Islamic parties and civil society actors to gain influence in the public sphere. This shift has increased overt discrimination against women and religious minorities in positions of power.

While our findings are specific to Indonesia, its experience is not atypical in the developing world. Its large state apparatus, high levels of ethnic and religious diversity, traditional gender norms, and history of both autocratic and democratic rule make it a useful case to shed light on the internal operation of a civil service under dictatorship and democracy. First, we do not expect democratization will worsen the representation of women and minority groups in dictatorships that are already exclusionary. Instead, our argument is most relevant to autocracies that implemented (relatively) inclusive policies to maintain regime stability. For example, we expect our proposed mechanism to be relevant for the historical transitions of former socialist dictatorships in Eastern and Central Europe (see, e.g., Rueschemeyer 1998). Second, our mechanism rests on the assumption that politics is meaningfully structured by identity cleavages and does not feature strong, preexisting norms of minority protection. Hence, cases of democratization in near-homogeneous societies or those with prior experience of democratic rule that have already established strong limits on majoritarian discrimination against minorities should be less affected by the dynamics we outline here.

Conceptually, our findings indicate democratization has profound effects on civil service practices, but not always in the direction predicted by optimistic theories of democratic accountability. As the large literature on illiberal democracies in a variety of contexts has shown, electoral accountability can generate vastly different policies and practices, depending on factors such as the presence of programmatic parties, norms, and strong institutions that protect minority rights. This observation seems to extend to the operation of the civil service. Our findings suggest democratization is, at best, a mixed blessing for the operation of the civil service in terms of the representation of women and minorities in leadership positions.

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## Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of the article.

**Appendix A:** Parallel Trends

**Appendix B:** Robustness Checks

**Appendix C:** Decentralization

**Appendix D:** Local Elections

**Appendix E:** Gender, Education, and Democratization

**Appendix F:** Overall Share of Women in District and Provincial Governments

**Appendix G:** Female Leadership

**Appendix H:** Change in Attitudes

**Appendix I:** Aceh Effect

**Appendix J:** Bali Effect

**Appendix K:** Islamic Party Minister

**Appendix L:** Muslim Party Share and Local Elections

**Appendix M:** Muslim Population Share and Local Elections

**Appendix N:** Christian Population Share and Local Elections

**Appendix O:** Comparison of Incoming Cohorts

**Appendix P:** Welfare Implications

**Appendix Q:** Patronage

**Appendix R:** Alternative Career Advancement—Golongan